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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the transformation of the European Union (EU) from a laggard to a leader in 
the international politics of biotechnology regulation. The emergence of EU leadership in global 
environmental politics during the 1990s seems to support recent arguments about the distinctive 
nature of the EU as a “normative power” in international relations. However, as this paper ar-
gues, this perspective lacks historical depth and fails to capture tensions between competing 
principles and conflict among domestic interest groups in Europe. The paper calls for a more 
critical reading of the normative power argument and identifies shifts in the domestic political 
economy of agricultural biotechnology as the key factors behind the EU’s support for a pre-
cautionary international regime on trade in genetically modified organisms.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Is the European Union (EU)2 a different kind of international actor, not just because of its 
unique institutional nature but also because of its predisposition to pursue different 
types of interests? This question has aroused considerable interest in recent years, with 
academics and practitioners debating whether the EU is a civilian rather than a military 
power (Smith 2005; Whitman 1998) and whether it is pursuing post-national or ethical 
interests in an attempt to shape global order through normative change rather than use 
of force (Manners and Whitman 2003; Therborn 1997). The conviction is gaining ground 
that the EU is not a conventional great power in waiting, but, as Ian Manners (2002) has 
suggested, a “normative power” that acts primarily through ideas and values, and not 
military or economic force. This suggestion has provoked considerable interest among 
scholars of EU foreign policy (Adler and Crawford 2004; Diez 2005; Lucarelli and Man-
ners 2006) and has been the subject of a special issue in the Journal of European Public 
Policy (Sjursen 2006). 
 
The notion of the EU as a qualitatively different, normative power has also informed re-
cent research on the EU’s role in international environmental politics. Indeed, the rise of 
European leadership on global environmental matters seems to fit in well with the argu-
ment that global interests and universal values are at the heart of European foreign pol-
icy. Of course, the EU has not escaped critical scrutiny of its many shortcomings in the 
environmental field (Eckley and Selin 2004; Jordan 2002), but the central role it played in 
creating the climate change regime (Vogler and Bretherton 2006) and promoting sustain-
able development at the UN (Lightfoot and Burchell 2005) arguably lends support to the 
claim that a commitment to global environmental norms is integral to the EU’s unique 
foreign policy identity. With the United States refusing to provide environmental leader-
ship and increasingly blocking new international environmental initiatives (Falkner 
2005), the EU has emerged as a pivotal actor in global environmental policymaking.  
 
This paper investigates the notion of the EU as a “green” normative power in an impor-
tant new area of environmental diplomacy, biosafety regulation, which is widely regard-
ed to be driven by distinctive societal values and a discursive shift towards greater pre-
caution (Andree 2005). The question of how to regulate genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) has become the focus of a bitter conflict between a U.S.-led group of GMO-
exporting countries and those countries wishing to strengthen regulatory authority over 
GMO imports. In the late 1990s, the EU emerged as a global leader in this area by setting 
a model for precautionary GMO regulation that many developing countries have sought 
to adopt. EU leadership has been critical to creating an international biosafety regime 
and establishing the principle of precaution in international biotechnology regulation – a 
highly controversial, emerging norm in international environmental law and politics 
that stands in competition to the norms and principles governing international trade 
(Eckersley 2004). 
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Some proponents of the normative power perspective view the transatlantic GMO con-
flict as a prominent example of how a “constitutive difference” (Lucarelli 2006: 4) be-
tween Europe and America shapes their international behavior, and how the EU shows 
“principled stances” (Welsh 2006: 74) in an international context. Indeed, societal values 
and preferences with regard to GM food vary considerably across the Atlantic, as nu-
merous studies have documented (for example, Jasanoff 2005). But, as this paper aims to 
show, EU leadership on precautionary GMO regulation is a more recent development 
and stands in marked contrast to earlier difficulties in developing a common European 
position on international biotechnology regulation. It is also, and more importantly, the 
result of a domestic shift in societal risk perceptions and interest configurations in Eu-
rope, rather than the straightforward outgrowth of its normative identity. It is argued 
here that the EU’s emergence as a “principled actor,” or leader, in international biotech-
nology regulation needs to be analyzed in a broader historical context and against the 
background of the domestic political economy of European biotechnology. By historiciz-
ing the EU’s green normative identity and locating it in a political-economic setting, this 
paper aims to contribute to a more critical reading of EU foreign policy identity and nor-
mative power more generally. 
 
The analysis proceeds in three steps. The second section reviews the debate on the EU’s 
emerging role in global environmental politics and places it in the wider context of a po-
litical economy of environmental leadership. The third section examines the changing 
political economy of biotechnology policy in Europe and links it to the transformation of 
the EU’s international role. The final section summarizes the key findings of this paper 
and makes a broader case for a critical perspective on EU normative power claims. 
 
2. A Political Economy Perspective on EU Environmental Leadership 
 
The EU has emerged as an important, increasingly powerful and, in some areas, leading 
player in environmental diplomacy (Vogler 2005; Zito 2005). Whereas in the early days 
of global environmentalism, after the first UN environment conference in 1972, the EU 
lacked an explicit environmental competence and many European countries dragged 
their feet on issues such as ozone layer depletion and acid rain, Europe’s international 
role underwent a gradual “greening” process from the late 1980s onwards. The EU gave 
a boost to the emerging precautionary principle in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, where it 
defined the principle as the basis for Community policy on the environment. It played 
an active role at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 
Rio de Janeiro and took the lead in pushing for the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol on cli-
mate change and other multilateral environmental agreements, including the 2000 Car-
tagena Protocol on Biosafety. By the time of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable De-
velopment in Johannesburg, many had pinned their hopes for a successful outcome on a 
strong EU role. The then EU Environment Commissioner Margot Wallström herself ech-
oed these expectations when she argued that the “EU has to play the leading role in en-
suring that Johannesburg delivers concrete proposals towards sustainability goals” 
(quoted in Lightfoot and Burchell 2005: 80). 
 
A key condition for the transformation of the EU’s international role was the creation of 
an explicit EU competence for environment (McCormick 2001: 55-68). The 1987 Single 
European Act provided the first legal basis, and the passage of the Treaty of European   4 
Union in 1993 further strengthened the EU’s environmental powers, listing environmen-
tal protection as one of the EU’s overall policy goals. Moreover, the Amsterdam Treaty 
of 1999 committed the EU to promoting sustainable development as an integral part of 
all EU policies, including foreign policy, and established sustainable development as a 
norm of EU politics (Baker 2006: 83). The gradual greening of the EU is also reflected in 
successive European Commission strategy papers, culminating in the 2001 strategy on 
sustainable development and 2002 global sustainability strategy (European Commission 
2001, 2002). EU leaders now routinely claim an environmental leadership role at home 
and worldwide. 
 
The EU’s prominence in environmental diplomacy has not gone unnoticed among schol-
ars of European foreign policy (Bretherton and Vogler 2005; Sbragia 2002). For some, Eu-
rope’s promotion of a global sustainability agenda is not just the sign of its strengthened 
role in foreign policy but suggests a more deep-rooted change in the EU’s foreign policy 
identity (Krämer 2004; Manners and Whitman 2003: 398). It is seen to reflect the particu-
lar values that the EU is based on as a polity and that it seeks to export abroad. In this 
view, European environmental leadership departs from the realpolitik tradition in foreign 
policy and promotes the global common good over and above the national interest. En-
vironmental diplomacy thus becomes part of global order policy and is infused with a 
universalist normative dimension. As I argue in this paper, this interpretation of the 
EU’s global green role is problematic. It provides an incomplete picture of the forces 
driving EU foreign policy and needs to be grounded in an analysis of the political-
economic basis and persisting inconsistencies of EU foreign environmental policy.  
 
Debate continues on what precisely the EU’s identity consists of – whether it is the use 
of civilian, non-military means or soft power, or the use of persuasion rather than force 
(see Smith 2005). Manners’s suggestion to view the EU as a normative power offers a 
new stimulus to this debate in that it provides an overarching framework of analysis 
based on an ideational or constructivist reading of the EU. At its heart is the claim that 
the EU, due to its new and distinctive political form, is committed to “placing universal 
norms and principles at the centre of its relations with its Member States (...) and the 
world ...” (Manners 2002: 241). Sustainable development is but one of the core norms 
that form part of the EU’s normative outlook, but plays an increasingly important role in 
the EU’s self-definition vis-à-vis the outside world. As defined by the Brundlandt Com-
mission in 1987 and further developed by the EU, sustainable development requires 
“that present needs should be met without compromising the ability of future genera-
tions to meet theirs” (Council of the European Union 2005), and is routinely referred to 
in EU documents as “a key principle governing all the Union’s policies and activities” 
(ibid.) or as a “deep-seated value of the European Union.”3 Indeed, sustainable develop-
ment is firmly established as a quasi-constitutional norm in articles 2 and 6 of the Treaty 
of the European Union (Maastricht Treaty). If, therefore, due to its distinctive nature the 
EU is predisposed “to act in a normative way in world politics” (Manners 2002: 252), we 
should expect it to project a green identity to the outside as well. 
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At first sight, this notion of the EU’s green normative power appeals, as it seems to cap-
ture the new reality of international environmental politics. European legislation in 
areas from greenhouse gas emissions trading to recycling, biosafety and eco-labeling is 
among the most advanced worldwide. Current efforts to create a comprehensive testing 
and evaluation scheme for up to 30,000 chemicals are unique in the world (Pesendorfer 
2006). The EU is the key driving force behind the harmonization of environmental stan-
dards in the now twenty-five member states and has a model effect on neighboring 
countries (Environmental Politics 2004). Furthermore, the drive for stricter environmen-
tal standards is underpinned by well-organized environmental groups and a public that 
places a comparatively high value on environmental protection, particularly in the 
northern European member states. For the EU to claim international environmental 
leadership is, therefore, broadly consistent with societal preferences in leading European 
states and organized environmental lobbying in Brussels. 
 
Should EU foreign environmental policy therefore be seen as a manifestation of norma-
tive power? As I argue below, while normative concerns may be a motivational force 
and inform interest formation, we can only gain a fuller understanding of the EU’s role 
in international environmental politics if we place it in its political-economic context. In 
this wider perspective, several shortcomings of the normative power perspective come 
to light: it lends itself to an a-historical understanding of European environmental pol-
icy; it mistakes the export of domestic norms with the pursuit of global interests and uni-
versal values; it fails to take into account the domestic interest structure that underpins 
regulatory internationalization; and it understates the potential dissonance between dif-
ferent values and norms at the heart of Europe’s identity. In the following, I briefly elab-
orate these points before moving on to examine the case of European biosafety policy. 
 
With regard to the first point, if we look back at the history of international environmen-
tal politics, it is far from self-evident that the EU should have emerged as a global envi-
ronmental leader. From the 1970s onwards, it was the U.S. that pioneered modern envi-
ronmental regulation and provided the main impetus for multilateral solutions to global 
problems. When U.S. environmental leadership began to weaken in the late 1980s, Japan 
was well placed to fill the emerging gap, but failed to do so against the backdrop of its 
deepening economic crisis of the 1990s. Instead, the EU gradually strengthened its inter-
national profile in environmental affairs, having adopted, at least in some areas, a more 
progressive approach to sustainability. Political change in the U.S. thus provided Europe 
with a “diplomatic windfall” that allowed European leaders to claim the mantle of lead-
ership. As the EU acquired legislative powers in the environmental field and began to 
take a more united stance on international issues, it was well placed to become the new 
international champion of precautionary environmental action (see Baker 2006: 85-88). 
But the U.S. experience holds important lessons for the EU. As David Vogel (2003) ar-
gues, the U.S. entered what could be called the “environmental policy cycle” much ear-
lier than the EU and has been experiencing an anti-regulatory backlash in recent years. 
In similar fashion, Europe has spent the last two decades building a comprehensive sys-
tem of EU-level environmental regulation, but efforts to extend this into new areas are 
met with growing resistance from concerned business interests. The rise of the competi-
tiveness agenda under the aegis of the EU’s Lisbon Strategy has already helped to shift 
the ground in favor of a more deregulatory outlook in Brussels, and concerted business   6 
lobbying has forced a weakening of recent proposals to expand the coverage of Euro-
pean chemicals regulation (Pesendorfer 2006). With tougher times ahead for European 
environmentalists, the EU may find that its self-proclaimed international leadership role 
is built on weak foundations. 
 
Second, what the normative power perspective portrays as the pursuit of universal val-
ues and global concerns is more appropriately described as the internationalization of 
European policies. European environmental leadership is largely based on attempts to 
export European regulatory standards and models abroad, as has happened repeatedly 
in the fields of food and biosafety regulation (Ansell and Vogel 2006; Sianelli 2004). This 
is done either as part of a deliberate strategy to internationalize EU regulations, or in-
directly through anonymous channels of policy diffusion. In the former case, the EU 
strives to raise international standards to the European level through multilateral nego-
tiation or through agreeing on accession accords with EU membership applicants (Car-
min and VanDeveer 2004). In the latter, European environmental policies impact on oth-
er countries via indirect mechanisms of norm transfer and “trading up” (Vogel 1997), in-
volving transnational green actors and companies operating across boundaries. In both 
these scenarios, it is Europe’s political clout and economic power as well as its central 
position in transnational green networks that allows the EU to shape environmental pol-
icy abroad in this way. Proponents of the normative power perspective dismiss this as a 
“relativist viewpoint” (Manners 2002: 240). But we should be careful not to equate a pol-
icy of regulatory internationalization with a normative project, for the EU may have 
higher environmental standards than other countries only in some, but not all, areas. 
Moreover, whether the export of European standards is in the interest of other countries 
remains an empirical question and cannot be determined a priori.  
 
Third, closely related to the last point is the question of under which conditions environ-
mental leadership arises. The normative power perspective is largely silent on this, pre-
suming instead that the pursuit of international policy objectives flows directly from the 
constitutional and normative identity of the EU. In contrast, a political economy per-
spective would emphasize the domestic factors behind the process of regulatory export, 
in particular domestic interest groups that lend support to internationalization efforts. 
Elizabeth DeSombre has demonstrated in her study of U.S. foreign environmental policy 
(2000) how coalitions of environmental pressure groups and corporations that are set to 
benefit from international regulation play an essential role in U.S. efforts to export regu-
latory standards. Similar domestic dynamics can be found in the EU, with environmen-
tally leading member states providing an additional push factor for regulatory export 
(Huber 1997). Support by domestic interest groups is of critical importance to the EU’s 
policy of regulatory export.  
 
Fourth, the normative power perspective understates the tensions that exist between dif-
ferent normative principles that make up the EU’s peculiar identity. Sustainable devel-
opment is not only a late arrival in the EU’s group of core principles, it also competes 
with other, more dominant, principles such as economic freedom, and specific policy 
agendas such as trade liberalization (Welsh 2006; Zito 2005). The EU has, of course, been 
eager to promote an integrated view of sustainable development that stresses the mutual 
supportiveness of economic and environmental objectives. But these efforts have yielded   7 
only limited success and have tended to crowd out a deeper vision of ecological sustain-
ability (Christoff 1996). 
 
Adopting a political economy perspective on European foreign environmental policy 
thus provides a critical corrective to the increasingly fashionable view that European en-
vironmental leadership is a reflection of a qualitatively distinct, normatively based, 
model of foreign policy. It points to the embeddedness of EU environmental policy in a 
wider political-economic context, and to unresolved conflicts between competing prin-
ciples and objectives in EU policy, particularly those of economic competitiveness and 
the interests of environmental sustainability. It highlights the crucial role played by do-
mestic interest groups in supporting a process of regulatory export, or internationaliza-
tion. And it provides clues as to why variation persists across different areas of EU for-
eign environmental policy, from leadership in climate change and biosafety politics to 
foot-dragging on reforming agricultural and fisheries policies. 
 
3. The Political Economy of Agricultural Biotechnology and the EU’s International 
Biosafety Policy 
 
The EU’s engagement with the international politics of biosafety changed dramatically 
over the last twenty years. Until the early 1990s, internal divisions held back the EU 
from playing a significant international role. Only in the mid-1990s did the EU come to 
accept the need for an international biosafety treaty and participated in the drafting of 
biosafety rules, though initially without attaching much political significance to these ef-
forts. In the late 1990s, however, the EU emerged as a key advocate of strict rules on in-
ternational GMO trade. It provided crucial leadership in the final round of negotiations 
on the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. The EU pushed for the adoption of the precau-
tionary principle in risk assessment and sought to assist developing countries in their 
efforts to strengthen domestic regulations, against the interests of the United States and 
other GMO exporters. 
 
What accounts for the EU’s transformation from laggard to leader in international bio-
safety politics? This paper argues that we need to look at shifts in the domestic political 
economy of agri-biotechnology if we are to understand European leadership, or what 
might be seen as the rise of normative power, in this area. “Domestic political economy” 
refers here to the interplay of domestic interests, both economic and societal, within Eu-
rope’s multi-level governance system and the broader ideational environment that 
shapes societal values and preferences. Operating within a pluralistic framework of lob-
bying and policymaking (Mazey and Richardson 2004), industrial, agricultural, environ-
mental and consumer interest groups have played an important role in shaping Euro-
pean GMO policy. As will be shown in this section, the rise of a Europe-wide anti-GM 
movement and the relative weakness of organized biotechnology interests provided the 
key background conditions for the dramatic shift in the EU’s stance in the international 
biosafety negotiations. None of this was the quasi-natural outflow of the EU’s normative 
identity. In fact, the EU’s international biosafety policy was driven by two conflicting 
imperatives embedded within the EU’s core values: the promotion of economic growth 
and competitiveness, on the one hand, and the protection of human health and the envi-
ronment, on the other. Quite how the EU would resolve this conflict and what norma-
tive identity it would assume in its external relations was an open question.    8 
 
The contrast with the field of medical biotechnology is instructive here. Whereas agricul-
tural biotechnology came to be framed in public discourses as an inherently risky tech-
nology, medical uses of genetic engineering continued to enjoy relatively high levels of 
popular support and industrial backing. The EU accordingly came to emphasize differ-
ent principles in these two areas: innovation and growth in medical biotechnology, and 
precaution and consumer protection in the agricultural side. A similar division emerged 
at the international level. When faced with demands by developing countries to subject 
all GMO uses to international regulatory controls, the EU insisted on retaining the dis-
tinction between GMOs as food and as pharmaceuticals, even though new developments 
(e.g., functional foods) were rendering this increasingly problematic. In the end, the EU 
– together with the U.S. – blocked efforts by developing countries to include GMOs as 
pharmaceuticals in the biosafety treaty. It was the domestic political economy of Euro-
pean biotechnology, not the EU’s normative identity, that explains this particular stance. 
 
3.1  International divisions, weak international role: 1980s to early 1990s 
 
During the 1970s and 1980s, a broad consensus existed among the world’s leading bio-
technology countries that the scientific community could be trusted to establish safety 
procedures for genetic engineering and that governments should not unduly hinder sci-
entific progress and industrial growth. When genetic engineering moved from the labo-
ratory to field trials in the 1980s, however, the challenges facing scientists and govern-
ments changed. Slowly but steadily, with rising environmental awareness and the 
growth of organized environmental campaign groups and parties in the 1980s (Bomberg 
1998), calls for governments to regulate modern biotechnology developed momentum. 
The first national regulations were created in the 1980s, first in the U.S. and some Euro-
pean countries (Denmark, Germany) and then at EU-level in 1990.  
 
Developing countries were the first to call for international regulations during the pre-
paratory meetings for UNCED (1992), but received a frosty reception in the industrialized 
world. The United States and Japan did not want to see their nascent biotechnology in-
dustries subjected to international controls, and although some smaller European states 
and the European Commission’s Directorate-General Environment4 expressed sympathy 
for the Southern position, the leading European biotechnology countries remained skep-
tical about an international treaty. Britain, France and Germany advocated instead non-
binding measures and merely agreed in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) to 
a commitment to “consider the need for and modalities of a protocol” dealing with the 
safety of trade in GMOs (CBD, Article 19.3). 
 
During the 1980s, the EU was in process of developing an environmental policy compe-
tence but had no authority to regulate genetic engineering. As member states crafted 
their own policy responses, the biotechnology industry faced an uneven regulatory envi-
ronment. Denmark and Germany, two countries where the environmental movement 
gained in strength and public opposition to biotechnology ran high (Boork and Jamison 
1990; Gill 1993), were the first to introduce comprehensive gene laws, in 1986 and 1990 
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XI, and is referred to as DG Environment for stylistic reasons.   9 
respectively. Other countries (the UK, France) continued to rely on voluntary or manda-
tory notification requirements, while some (Italy, Luxembourg) did not create any GMO-
specific regulations. Thus, with the exception of Denmark, and to some extent Germany, 
EU member states employed a “light touch” approach to biotechnology regulation. 
Throughout this period, the biotechnology sector enjoyed strong political support in Eu-
ropean capitals and in Brussels, where the European Commission’s Science Directorate-
General championed its cause (Patterson 2000: 321-3). 
 
A major turning point in EU biosafety policy came in 1990 with the creation of an EU-
level system of biosafety regulation. Initially, this did not change European govern-
ments’ attitude to international regulation, although it was to have profound consequen-
ces for the EU’s later international role. The European Commission had made repeated 
attempts during the 1980s to harmonize national regulations. The Commission’s propo-
sals were informed not so much by pressing safety concerns as by economic interests, in 
particular the desire to catch up with the industry leaders, the United States and Japan. 
By linking regulatory harmonization in biotechnology with the creation of a Single Euro-
pean Market, the Commission succeeded in gaining regulatory competence for biosafety 
and established a comprehensive system of risk regulation in 1990 (Directives 90/219/ 
EC and 90/220/EC). This success came, however, at a considerable political cost for the 
pro-biotech forces within the Commission. Following the Danish model, regulatory au-
thority over agricultural biotechnology was handed to the recently created Directorate-
General Environment. DG Environment had argued successfully for an integrated 
framework of technology-based regulation that seeks to prevent harm to the natural en-
vironment from GMO releases. The 1990 regulations established for the first time a hori-
zontal, process-oriented approach to regulating biotechnology in Europe, in sharp con-
trast to the more limited approach in the United States that presumed substantial equi-
valence between biotech and conventional products. European regulators also intro-
duced the precautionary principle, allowing authorities to prevent GMO releases and 
commercialization under conditions of scientific uncertainty, i.e., without proof of harm.  
 
The introduction of largely pro-environmental regulations in 1990 reversed the previous 
trend towards a business-friendly biotechnology policy in Europe. Indeed, the biotech 
sector was weakly involved in the drafting process and failed to mobilize support within 
the Commission against DG Environment’s legislative proposals. Although working in 
close alliance with DG Science and many member state governments, European biotech-
nology companies were slow to organize themselves at EU-level and to lobby European 
institutions at a time when the regulatory environment was in flux. They were held back 
by a tradition of organizing around products, not industrial processes, and a fragmenta-
tion of the biotechnology sector into small and medium-sized firms (Greenwood and 
Ronit 1995). It was only in 1989, when the drafting process for the new GMO regulations 
was nearing its end, that the Council of the European Chemical Industry (CEFIC) created 
the Senior Advisory Group for Biotechnology (SAGE), the first European industry group 
on biotechnology (Cantley 1995: 633-4). 
 
The 1990 regulations had profound, long-term, consequences for the EU’s role in inter-
national biosafety politics. While initially the EU remained divided on the question of in-
ternational regulation, the new regulations made it more difficult in the long run for it to 
oppose a biosafety treaty. Having created the world’s most stringent biosafety rules and   10 
being committed to multilateralism, the EU had no choice but to accept the legitimacy of 
developing country demands for a binding international treaty. In this sense, EU foreign 
policy followed the logic of a normative power perspective. Moreover, the EU’s new 
regulatory approach provided a blueprint for other countries wishing to introduce or 
strengthen biotechnology regulation and became a major reference point in the 
development of a precautionary treaty. The 1990 EU regulations put the EU at the fore-
front of developing precautionary risk regulation. They set off a political dynamic that 
would eventually slow down the commercialization of agricultural biotechnology in Eu-
rope at a time when the United States and a handful of other countries were rapidly in-
troducing GM crops. Instead of closing the technology gap with the U.S. and Japan, Eu-
rope was adopting a GMO-importer perspective that prioritized risk regulation over tech-
nology promotion. 
 
3.2  From indifference to active international engagement: mid-1990s  
 
It took some time for the change in the EU’s regulatory framework to feed into its inter-
national position. One important reason for this time lag was the resurgence of business 
lobbying and influence. In response to the 1990 regulations, the European biotech sector 
launched a concerted lobbying campaign in Brussels and mobilized biotech-friendly 
member states. With public debates on GMO safety waning in the early 1990s (Torgersen 
et al. 2002: 57-9), the scene was set for a deregulatory push in Europe. At the interna-
tional level, leading EU member states continued to press ahead with the drafting of a 
framework of voluntary safety guidelines, the 1995 UNEP International Technical Guide-
lines for Safety in Biotechnology (Cantley 1995: 632-3). Developing countries reiterated 
their demands for a biosafety treaty at the first Conference of the Parties (COP-1) to the 
CBD in 1994, but the United States and leading EU member states remained skeptical and 
recommended instead the use of the UNEP Guidelines. 
 
Pressure grew during the 1990s for the EU to provide a more fertile environment for bio-
technology. The 1990 regulatory framework was one of industry’s main sources of frus-
tration but also provided it with a focal point for political mobilization and organization. 
Unlike the various anti-GM campaign groups that were mostly nationally organized, in-
dustry was quick to put its lobbying effort on a European footing and saw the power 
balance temporarily shift in its favor (Grabner et al. 2001: 17). After the creation in 1989 
of  SAGE, the various national biotechnology associations joined forces and in 1991 
formed the European Secretariat of National Bioindustry Associations (ESNBA) (Cantley 
1995: 635). They stepped up their lobbying effort in 1996 with the creation of EuropaBio, 
an umbrella body that has since developed into the main European biotechnology 
group. Their demands for a less restrictive regulatory environment were boosted by the 
growing perception that EU efforts to close the global technology gap were faltering. De-
spite the fact that Europe had increased R&D spending, the U.S. industry remained the 
most dynamic worldwide. By the mid-1990s, there were twice as many start-up compa-
nies in the U.S. as in Europe, U.S. companies were spending ten times as much on R&D 
as their European competitors, and their revenues were nine times higher than those in 
Europe (Paugh and Lafrance 1997: 101).  
 
Against the background of stronger industry lobbying and a decline in public concern 
over genetic engineering in the early 1990s, the pendulum of opinion within the Com-  11 
mission started to swing back temporarily in favor of reducing the regulatory burden 
and stimulating industrial growth (Torgersen et al. 2002: 50-60). Such a change in policy 
was of course in accordance with some of the EU’s underlying principles and priorities 
(economic freedom, competition and innovation), despite the precautionary principle 
gaining ground in the 1990s. But the industry-friendly turn in Brussels was shortlived, 
as international developments took on a dynamic of their own and fed back into Euro-
pean policymaking. While European industry lobbying concentrated on the reform of 
EU legislation, the EU came under increasing international pressure to agree to the start 
of biosafety negotiations. The issue of whether to create a biosafety protocol to the CBD 
was again on the agenda of the Second Conference of the Parties (COP-2) in Jakarta in 
1995. Positions within the EU had moved little since the 1992 UNCED  meeting, and the 
Council adopted a negotiation mandate for COP-2 that balanced the diverging views of 
member states, envisaging a two-track approach of supporting voluntary biosafety 
guidelines while agreeing in principle to talks on a biosafety treaty (Bail, Decaestecker 
and Jørgensen 2002: 169). A large number of parties to the CBD were now willing to start 
negotiations, however, and the EU consented to the majority view without attaching too 
much importance or urgency to the process. In other words, the EU entered the interna-
tional biosafety process without a clear and urgent normative commitment. 
 
3.3 Europe’s emerging leadership role: 1997 to 2000 
 
It was only after the start of the biosafety talks in 1996 that a clearer and more coherent 
EU interest in international biosafety regulation began to emerge. Having self-
consciously presented its role as one of promoting global interests, and particularly 
those of developing countries (Bail 2000: 23), the EU came to push for the adoption of an 
innovative biosafety treaty that emphasized ecological precaution over trade interests. 
This was in sharp contrast to the U.S. and Canadian position that other countries per-
ceived to be driven primarily by commercial concerns. However, the EU sided with the 
U.S. in objecting to a comprehensive scope of the treaty and the inclusion of pharmaceu-
ticals, as demanded by developing countries. Two major changes brought about this 
transformation in the EU’s stance: the arrival of GM crops in international agricultural 
trade, which raised the commercial and political stakes involved and provided the anti-
GM movement with an opportunity to channel popular unease about GM food into a 
political campaign; and a corresponding shift in the EU’s domestic GMO policy towards 
greater precaution. 
 
The opening phase of the biosafety negotiations coincided with the first commercial in-
troduction in the United States of GM food crops such as soybeans and maize, which 
quickly began to appear in agricultural trade. Indeed, in the autumn of 1996, Europe re-
ceived the first shipment of GM crops from the United States, which attracted wide-
spread media coverage and fueled fears about food safety among European consumers 
(Pollack and Shaffer 2005: 21). Several authors have explained the strength of the anti-
GM movement in Europe with reference to a wider crisis in European food safety (Pol-
lack and Shaffer 2005; Vogel 2003), particularly in the wake of the BSE crisis. Although 
BSE, or “mad cow disease,” was unrelated to plant genetic engineering, it cast a shadow 
on efforts to introduce GM food in Europe. Activist groups such as Greenpeace and 
Friends of the Earth orchestrated protests against experimental GMO planting and GM   12 
food on supermarket shelves around Europe (Osgood 2001). Unlike in the United States, 
where the public remained largely indifferent to GM food, European opinion polls re-
vealed rapidly rising anti-GM sentiment among a public concerned more with food safe-
ty than agricultural productivity (Torgersen et al. 2002: 61-74). 
 
The GM controversy created a dilemma for EU authorities. Whereas the European Com-
mission believed its regulatory system was working well, some EU member state gov-
ernments (especially Austria, France and Greece) reacted nervously to rising anti-GM 
sentiment and demanded a temporary halt to new GMO authorizations. Based on the 
decision-making rules of Directive 90/220, the Commission was able to approve a new 
GM maize variety in January 1997 despite failing to win the support of Member States. 
But the GMO authorization process eventually collapsed in 1999 as more and more gov-
ernments invoked the Directive’s safeguard clause, thus preventing the implementation 
of GMO approvals in member states (Pollack and Shaffer 2005: 23-4). European biotech-
nology policy entered what seemed like a “perfect storm” in 1998-99 as it came under 
simultaneous attack from different sides: parallel anti-GM campaigns by environmental 
and consumer groups sprang up in several member states; the European Parliament 
called for a strengthening of European safety provisions; and food retailers withdrew al-
ready authorized GM food products from the market. All the while, the European bio-
tech sector struggled to overcome its fragmented industry structure and failed to win 
over European farmers, who were fearful of hostile consumer reaction to GM food (Ber-
nauer 2003: 80-86). The EU had no choice but to seek to calm the situation by introduc-
ing a de facto moratorium on GMO approvals while it sought to revise its regulatory 
framework (Skogstad 2003: 327-30). By 1999, at a crucial point in the international bio-
safety negotiations, precaution had won over trade liberalization and competitiveness 
concerns in shaping Europe’s political identity in biotechnology regulation. 
 
The domestic shift in Europe had two important consequences for international bio-
safety politics: first, the EU’s increasingly restrictive stance on GMO authorizations sent 
an important signal to those developing countries still deciding whether or not to adopt 
GM technology, reinforcing existing biosafety concerns there (interviews with govern-
ment officials in India, April 4, 2001, and China, August 17, 2004). Moreover, with the 
European food market temporarily closed to GM crop imports, developing country ex-
porters in Africa and Asia feared that their own farm products would be barred from the 
European market if they introduced GMOs domestically. The European GM debate was 
therefore closely watched in the developing world, and the European moratorium fur-
ther hardened anti-GM positions, especially in Africa and Asia (Clapp 2006; Falkner 
2006). 
 
Second, the rise of anti-GM sentiment and the regulatory impasse of the late 1990s had a 
direct impact on the EU’s negotiation role in the biosafety talks. The international con-
text gained political salience in Europe and became a test case for the EU’s ability to 
withstand North American pressure against precautionary GMO  import restrictions. 
American threats to open Europe’s gates to GM products by bringing a legal case at the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) only served to underline the importance of a strong in-
ternational treaty that would lend legitimacy, if not full legal cover, to Europe’s regula-
tory framework. Germany’s new Red-Green coalition government of 1998 ended its pre-
decessor’s skeptical position, thus removing a key obstacle to a more proactive Euro-  13 
pean role (interview with EU negotiator, January 27, 2000). As the talks entered their fi-
nal stage in 1999, the EU was now arguing for the adoption of stringent biosafety rules. 
The fact that the focus of the talks had shifted to the regulation of agricultural commod-
ity shipments had promoted a more united EU negotiation role, as trade issues were tra-
ditionally negotiated by the European Commission on behalf of the Union. In this case, 
however, the Commission’s DG Environment, not DG Trade, led the negotiations and 
pushed for an international agreement that closely mirrored its own EU-wide GMO regu-
lations.5  
 
Chief among the EU’s position in the final round of negotiations, from 1999 to 2000, 
were three elements of the treaty that were fiercely resisted by the U.S.-led Miami 
Group6 of agricultural export countries (Falkner 2002): 7 
 
• The precautionary principle, allowing importing countries to restrict GMO trade 
under conditions of scientific uncertainty. This was seen as a major plank in the 
defense against potential WTO legal challenges.  
• Clear rules on identification of GM content in international agricultural trade, 
to support domestic regulatory authorities; and  
• The mutual supportiveness of the biosafety treaty and international trade rules, 
in order to prevent agricultural exporters from challenging GMO import restric-
tions at the WTO. 
 
While European negotiators aligned themselves with the developing countries to reach 
an agreement on these and other elements of the treaty, they did not go along with all 
their demands. On the whole, EU negotiators failed to offer leadership in the negotia-
tions on issues that went beyond what was contained in the EU’s domestic regulatory 
framework. The Like-Minded Group of developing countries had argued from the be-
ginning for a more comprehensive scope of the protocol than both the EU and the 
United States were willing to accept. Demands for a liability regime, which would oblige 
GMO exporters to compensate importing nations for any future damage inflicted from 
the release of GMOs, were also met with resistance by the U.S. and skepticism by the EU. 
Finally, the inclusion of GMOs that were pharmaceuticals for humans was blocked by 
both the U.S. and the EU. On the latter, the EU argued that pharmaceutical GMOs fell 
outside the remit of the protocol as they were covered by other international agreements 
and were not designed to be released into the environment, although recent advances in 
the medical use of GM crops and food products have started to blur the distinction be-
                                                 
5In common with other environmental negotiations, the biosafety talks fell into the category of 
“mixed negotiations,” with member states and the EU having concurrent power to negotiate and 
sign the agreement. Unlike in other environmental negotiations (e.g. climate change), however, 
the strong trade dimension of the biosafety negotiations allowed the Commission to become the 
main spokesperson of the EU during the end phase of the talks (Bail, Decaestecker and Jørgensen 
2002: 168-71; see Bretherton and Vogler 2005, chapter 3, on mixed competence in environmental 
negotiations).  
6Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, the United States and Uruguay.  
7The EU’s final negotiation mandate for the 2000 Montreal conference was agreed by the EU En-
vironment Ministers on December 13, 1999, and was made public in a press release on January 
27, 2000 (2235th Council Meeting – Environment, Brussels, December 13-14, 1999. Conseil/ 
99/409).   14 
tween agricultural and medical biotechnology. This, therefore, was not simply a ques-
tion of the technical delineation of one regime context from another. It reflected the na-
ture of the issue at hand as much as political expediency. Pharmaceutical companies 
were lobbying hard at the biosafety negotiations to have their products exempted from 
the Protocol’s scope and found receptive ears among the EU’s and Miami Group’s nego-
tiation teams (interview with UK corporate representative, January 28, 2000).  
 
A policy of regulatory export was at the center of Europe’s global leadership ambition. It 
was motivated by a desire to secure international legitimacy for the EU’s own precau-
tionary approach against the background of rising transatlantic trade tensions and 
threats of a WTO legal challenge.8 The anti-GM shift in European public opinion had pre-
cipitated a firmer international stance, but EU negotiators were keen to insure that inter-
national treaty obligations would not go beyond domestic regulations and would not ex-
tend to the less controversial applications of genetic engineering in the medical realm. 
EU biosafety leadership was thus closely circumscribed by the calculus of economic in-
terest, and support for the regulatory framework of the Cartagena Protocol, which was 
adopted in January 2000, reflected not so much a normative stance as a peculiar balan-
cing act amidst competing principles and domestic interests. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
With the help of a case study in environmental diplomacy, this paper has sought to ad-
dress some bigger questions about the EU’s foreign policy identity, particularly whether 
the EU is a different kind of power, due to its distinctive political structure and value 
system, and whether the EU’s commitment to multilateralism and sustainable develop-
ment predisposes it to perform an environmental leadership function. This paper has 
sought to strike a cautionary note. It has argued for placing such questions in a broader 
context of inquiry, one that is reflective of the historical gestation of Europe’s foreign 
policy identity and that pays closer attention to the political-economic forces that shape 
the EU’s engagement with the world. The aim has not been to dismiss questions about 
normative power, or to reject what is now a broad stream of ideational and constructiv-
ist research in EU studies (see Christiansen, Jorgensen and Wiener 2001). Rather, the 
analysis in this paper suggests that we need to situate the EU’s emerging identity in its 
historical context and connect the study of identity with that of interests, just as the 
study of interest formation has paid more attention to ideational sources (see Checkel 
1998). Above all, we need to retain a critical perspective on any claim that power serves 
global interests and universal values.9 
 
Admittedly, examining a single case will not provide conclusive answers in this debate. 
This paper has focused on only one dimension of Europe’s emerging normative power, 
namely global environmental leadership, and within that on the case of GMOs. But the 
international politics of biosafety provides an ideal vantage point for developing a more 
critical reading of the normative power perspective that should be useful in other areas. 
                                                 
8The U.S., together with Canada and Argentina, eventually launched a WTO case against the EU’s 
GMO moratorium in 2003, which the EU lost in first instance in 2006. The Cartagena Protocol was 
cited by the EU in its defense but was not the subject of the ruling itself. 
9For a related argument in the field of EU human rights policy, see Youngs 2004.   15 
This concluding section briefly summarizes the main findings before sketching out an 
agenda for future research.  
At first sight, the GMO case would seem to offer strong support for the normative power 
perspective. During the end phase of the biosafety negotiations, the EU provided crucial 
leadership in pushing for international regulations based on the precautionary principle, 
which has emerged as a key principle informing the EU’s sustainability strategy and 
other policies, but remains contested internationally. The EU did so in a remarkably ef-
fective way: it led the way with the world’s most advanced system of domestic GMO 
regulation and was able to speak with one voice towards the end of the biosafety nego-
tiations. Furthermore, despite losing the first round in a highly charged WTO dispute, it 
has stood firm in its defense of national regulatory autonomy and strengthened GMO 
regulation by introducing new labeling and traceability rules in 2004 (see the contribu-
tions in Falkner 2007).  
 
But closer analysis of the EU’s leadership role in biosafety reveals a more nuanced pic-
ture. Viewed over the ten-year history of international biosafety politics, it becomes clear 
that the EU’s distinctive stance was not simply the outgrowth of a deep-rooted norma-
tive orientation but the result of often protracted domestic battles over the future of bio-
technology and the right balance between competing normative principles. It was only 
when a rise in anti-GM sentiment put pro-biotechnology forces on the defensive and 
forced a moratorium on new GMO authorizations that the EU attached greater impor-
tance to the biosafety talks and offered international leadership. It did so by seeking to 
export its own domestic regulatory model and by insuring that international rules 
would not threaten the EU’s economic interests in other areas of biotechnological inno-
vation, especially in the medical area. Despite its commitment to comprehensive and 
precautionary GMO regulation, the EU sided with the United States in rejecting calls by 
developing countries for an international liability regime and for inclusion of pharma-
ceutical GMOs in the Cartagena Protocol. The EU thus largely succeeded in molding in-
ternational biosafety governance around its own regulatory model, which seeks to pre-
serve a delicate balance between environmental and economic interests, and between 
precautionary regulation of agri-biotechnology and promotion of medical biotechnol-
ogy.  
 
None of this is intended to negate the achievement of creating precautionary rules on 
GMO trade. But the experience of international biotechnology regulation supports the 
growing recognition that a policy of regulatory export follows a domestic political-
economic logic. Normative intentions may be a motivating force, but they rarely suffice 
to sustain an effort to internationalize domestic policy through environmental diplo-
macy. Identity and interests are thus closely intertwined. If we wish to understand the 
prospects for, and inconsistencies in, the EU’s emerging role as a global environmental 
leader, we need to pay closer attention to the political-economic foundations – and limi-
tations – of such a role. 
 
The lessons of the GMO case apply in other cases of environmental diplomacy, too. The 
EU’s leadership on climate change has been widely noted, especially when compared 
with U.S. intransigence, but the limitations of this role are closely connected with the po-
litical economy of energy production, manufacturing and consumption in Europe. In 
this sense, a political-economic analysis provides important clues for why the EU, de-  16 
spite a general commitment to sustainable development and environmental precaution, 
appears to be a leader in some areas (biosafety, climate) but not others (agriculture, fish-
eries). The relative strength of different EU regulatory policies and of competing domes-
tic interests will be a good first-cut indicator of the likelihood of EU environmental lead-
ership emerging at the international level.  
 
A political-economic perspective should also prove useful outside the environmental 
area, when examining the nature and limitations of claims about EU normative power. 
Aspirations to promote development, human rights and sustainability throughout all 
areas of European foreign policy are now commonplace. But a considerable gap persists 
between the EU’s support for universal norms and the reality of European international 
action. This is often explained with reference to implementation problems but may in 
fact be symptomatic of deeper tensions between competing normative aspirations and 
between different domestic forces that shape specific policies. In the case of trade policy, 
for example, which is among the most integrated and successful areas of a common Eu-
ropean foreign policy, aspirations of normative leadership as evidenced in EU support 
for developmental goals within the current WTO Doha Development Round are closely 
circumscribed by the underlying political economy of agriculture in Europe.  
 
A political economy of European normative identity is therefore needed to add a critical 
dimension to the now widespread perception that Europe is a different international ac-
tor. In a field of study that is at constant risk of moral hyperbole, this would make for a 
more historically sensitive account of how norms and interest interact in the formation 
of European foreign policy and identity. This is not to deny the role of norms and values 
but to highlight the specific, time-bound context in which they assume meaning and 
relevance for Europe’s role in the world. 
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